In this paper, we considered the competition between two multi-echelon supply chains with identical structures on price under two market power structures. For this purpose, we developed two different scenarios. In the first scenario, both supply chains decided simultaneously (the Nash game). In the second scenario, due to the imbalance of power between the two supply chains, we adopted the Stackelberg game in the model. The paper investigated the effects of different relations between the market sizes of supply chains and the supply chain structures on price and profit along with the analysis of power in the market. Based on these assumptions, it was found that the supply chains did not always involve the second-mover advantage in the price Stackelberg game. Furthermore, having the centralized structure, both of the supply chains benefited from presence of a leader in the market for different combinations of market size.
integration were particular modes of the Nash bargaining on the wholesale prices. Price competition between two supply chains was studied by Zheng et al. [25] . They assumed that one of the supply chains was normal, and the other was reverse. They further studied the impact of the degree of competition intensity between the two chains and the product return rate of the reverse supply chain on the profit and price equilibria. Hafezalkotob et al. [26] formulated a competitive model in multi-product green supply chains under government supervision to reduce the environmental pollution cost. They provided a novel approach to construct a model that maximized the government tariffs and profits of the suppliers and manufacturers in all the green supply chains. Taleizadeh and Sadeghi [27] considered two competitive reverse supply chains that competed in collection and refurbishment of used products after their useful lives. In this regard, papers by Ha and Tong [28] , Wu [29] , and Li and Li [30] can be cited. Table 1 shows the studies reviewed in the present section.
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The following critiques can be inferred from the review of the related literature shown in Table  1 .
-Most of the previous studies have investigated the competition between two-echelon supply chains, in order to simplify the problem. Therefore, in the present study, a three-echelon supply chain is taken into account so that it gets closer to the reality. The number of decision variables of the problem increases as the number of supply chain levels rises to three levels, and the complexity of the model thus increases as well.
-It is understood that most of the above studies have investigated their models assuming the Nash relation to hold between the chains, whereas a few studies such as Amin Naseri & Azari Khojasteh [23] and Qian [17] have considered the imbalance of power in the market between the supply chains. Given the market sizes and structures of the supply chains, the Nash and Stackelberg games are compared in this study for recognition of whether or not concurrence or sequence of motion between the chains is in their favor. Our study extends the literature by analyzing the simultaneous impact of the movement types, market sizes, and structures of supply chains on their profits and prices. It is clear from the related literature that the previous research has investigated only a special case of chain structures and of the types of game between them. In this study, however, notable results are obtained through investigation of different scenarios of combination of chain structures and power structures between them. In other words, this research is innovative in that it analyzes different scenarios, and finally helps managers make decisions in different conditions of the market and competitors. This research is conducted based on the activities of two supply chains in the home appliances industry in Iran (as requested by the chains, there is no mention of them in this paper). These two chains are the two main rivals in the Iranian market because of their production of substitutable products. Customers of these types of product are highly sensitive to price. These chains can use two structures for selling their goods. For reasons such as historical background, fame, innovation, and other marketing criteria mentioned above, a leader may be assigned in the market. The brands examined in this study have the same level of background and reputation in the market. Thus, one chain can perhaps act as a leader in the market by introducing a new product. The rival chain can compete with the leading chain by producing similar and/or substitutable products. In fact, the proposed model will be functional in any duopoly market with two competitive supply chains with the above conditions.
3-Model definition
This section is dedicated to specification of price for the two rival supply chains. The following assumptions are made. a) Each supply chain consists of three levels. b) The manufacturer is more influential than the others, and makes the initial decision. c) In each chain, all the members try to maximize their own profit. d) All the members have complete information about the demand. e) Demand is a function of price aimed at focusing on the competitive factor. f) Unit cost (including the costs of goods storage and dispatch, manpower, and damaged goods, etc.) is assumed to be inconsiderable, i.e. zero, for all the supply chain members for the sake of simplicity in solving the model. Table 2 shows the parameters of the model.
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As in the study by Amin Naseri & Azari Khojasteh [23] , the demand structure is assumed to be symmetrical between two products here; therefore, the demand function can be rewritten as follows: For the above demand function, we have:
Eq. (2) shows that demand decreases as product price increases, and Eq. (3) demonstrates that increase in the price of one product increases the demand for another product. For examination of the effect of competition, all the model parameters are assumed to be known and deterministic. This assumption has also been made by some other researchers [30, 32] . We also assume that   . Assumption (4), which has been taken into account in previous studies such as Amin Naseri & Azari Khojasteh [23] , Modak et al. [5] , Wang et al. [9] , denotes that the customers of a particular product are more sensitive to the price of that product than to the competitor's price. The problem is considered in two modes as follows.
Mode 1: Both of the supply chains are centralized (CC)
In this case, the following two scenarios are possible according to the balance or imbalance mode of market power between the chains: In scenarios S-C and S-D, we assume that one chain, which acts as the leader, is stronger than the other in the market. Without loss of generality, it is assumed in the Stackelberg game that the first chain is the leader, and the second one acts as the follower. Additionally, in scenarios S-C and S-D, there will be two and three Stackelberg games, respectively.
4-Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we intend to obtain the price equilibrium in different scenarios. In each scenario, stepwise and consecutive procedures are followed to determine the decision variable equilibrium. For a centralized supply chain, the profit function is as follows:
Moreover, if the supply chain is decentralized, we have:
N-C)
In this scenario, both supply chains concurrently specify * Ri p to maximize their profits. The procedure is solved as follows.
(1) Differentiation of the objective function with respect to the decision variable ( Thus, the decision variable equilibrium values in each chain are as follows. 
S-C)
The procedures of the leader-follower problem are solved as follows.
(i) Follower problem (1) Differentiation of function (5) 
Leader problem 
The solution procedure is as follows.
(1) Differentiation of function (8) 
Theorem 2. The retailer's profit function is strictly concave. Proof. For Π i R , we have:
On the other hand, Proof. For this function: 21 . Therefore, 1 Π M is strictly concave. All of the above issues are true for 2 Π M as well. ■ As a result of Theorem 4, it can be stated that the values obtained for * Mi w are optimal and unique. Therefore, the optimal distributor and retailer prices are as follows, respectively:
More information about the above parameters ( 1 A , 2 A , …) is available in Appendix 2.
S-D)
The solution procedure is as follows. , as a result of which we have:
(2) Replacement of Eq. (14) in the distributor's profit function, which obtains   
5-Analytical results with respect to market size
In this section, a comparison is made between the equilibria of retail prices and profits of the chains in different scenarios given both equality and inequality in the market sizes of the supply chains. For this purpose, analysis is made in the following two sections in terms of the structures of the supply chains and the Nash and Stackelberg relations between the chains. It is worth mentioning that the relations between the prices and profits of the chains are analytically determined in different cases. However, it is not possible to generally prove the relations in some cases due to their complexity. Therefore, these relations are specified using numerical examples. For this purpose, the following numerical set is used for the parameters: 
Given that   , X is defined as follows:
5-1. Comparison of the Nash and Stackelberg relations
Given the structures of the supply chains, the profits and sale prices of the products in the Nash and Stackelberg modes are compared in two separate sections.
5-1-1. CC structure
The price equilibria and profits of the supply chains with the same market size in different scenarios are shown in Table 3 (The table appears in Appendix 3).
The following theorem can be extracted from Table (3) .
Theorem 1) Assuming that 1 2   , we have:
This theorem is proven in Appendix 1.
2) 1 2
 
In this section, the difference in price and profit between the Nash and Stackelberg modes will be as follows: 2  2  2  2  3  2  2  1  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2   4  2  3  2  2  Π Π   16 2 4
Theorem 2) If the centralized supply chains have different market sizes, then using the above equations, we will have:
For a conclusion to be drawn, other relations between the profits and sale prices of the supply chains should be evaluated. Due to the complexity of these relations, the numerical set Y is used in this section to specify the expected relations. These relations are shown in Table 4 (The table is available in Appendix 3).
Result 1)
For two centralized supply chains, the following conditions hold.
Regardless of the market sizes of the two chains, both chains receive more profits in the market power imbalance mode than in market power balance. Therefore, presence of a leader in the market is beneficial to both chains (whether as a follower or as a leader).
The following reasons seem to account for the occurrence of this result. 1-Due to the popularity of the brand or innovative activities and novel decisions of the leader, the follower has to improve and develop its activities and performance to be able to compete in the market. In the Nash game, however, the performance and activities of the two competitors are at the same level. 2-In the Nash game, the players are unaware of each other's decisions. In Stackelberg, however, the follower's awareness of the leader's decision allows him to make the best decision and perfect use of market capacity. Therefore, companies gain higher profits here than in Nash.
5-1-2. DD structure
Table (5) shows the price and profit relations in the Nash and Stackelberg scenarios for both conditions of equality and inequality of market sizes in the two chains (The table appears in Appendix 3). It is not possible to specify these relations analytically due to the complexity of relations in decentralized chains. Therefore, the numerical set Y is used.
Result 2) Regardless of the market sizes of the supply chains in the decentralized structure, the following points can be concluded.  Comparison of the prices of power balance and imbalance in the market 1) If the chain is a leader (the first supply chain in the Stackelberg scenario), the retailer price of the chain will be lower than that in the Nash scenario for all values of set X. However, the Stackelberg manufacturer and supplier prices of the chain will be lower than those in the Nash scenario if the following conditions are met for the defined values of  and  in set X:
As observed, conditions 5, 9, and 14 are true in these relations.
2) If the chain is a follower (the second supply chain in the Stackelberg scenario), the manufacturer price and distributor price of the chain will be lower than those in the Nash scenario for all values of set X. However, the Stackelberg retailer price of the chain will be lower than that in the Nash scenario if the following conditions are met for the values defined for  and  in X:
As observed, conditions 3, 6, and 13 are true in this relation.
 Comparison of the profits in the market power balance and imbalance modes If the chain is a leader, all members of the chain will obtain lower profits than when there is no leader in the market. However, for the following chain in the Stackelberg scenario, the profits of chain members will be greater than those in market power balance. Finally, compared to the state-of-affairs in the market power balance mode, the total profit of the leading supply chain will decrease, and that of the following supply chain will increase. 
5-2. Comparison of the Stackelberg relations
A comparison is made between the profits and sale prices of the products of both supply chains in the Stackelberg scenario (between the leader and the follower) given the structures of the supply chains.
5-2-1. CC structure
The relations between the prices and profits of the leading and following centralized supply chains are as follows:
Proof. According to Assumption (*) (Appendix 1), (i) is always positive. Therefore, 1
It is obvious that (ii) is always negative; therefore, 1
Result 3) According to Theorem 3, the supply chain enjoys the second-mover advantage; i.e., the follower's profit is better than that of the leader.
Since the supply chains have the same market size, and their decision-making is based on the Stackelberg game, and price is the decision variable of the game, the follower can obtain a higher profit as the second mover than the first (leader) by offering a lower price.
2) 1 2   For specification of the relations between the prices and profits of the leading and following supply chains in the Stackelberg game, the following relations can be considered.
It is not possible to specify the signs of these relations due to the existing complexity. Therefore, the numerical values of set Y are used. It is worth noting that the selected values of set Y are true for Assumption (*).
i) If 1 2   , the following relations will be true for all the defined values of set Y:
ii) If 1 2   , the following relations will be true for all the defined values of set Y:
Result 4)
For the leading and following supply chains with centralized structures and different market sizes, the following conditions hold.
-If the chain with a smaller market size functions as the leader, the following supply chain will obtain more profit as the second mover with a greater market size than that of the leader.
-If the leading chain has a greater market size, the follower cannot obtain more profit than the leader. Although the follower is the second mover, and offers a lower price for selling its product, the market size of the leader leads to achievement of a higher profit than that of the follower. Finally, the relations that are true for the profits of the retailer, supplier, and manufacturer can lead to the following result:
Result 5) For the leading and following chains in the DD structure with the same market size, the following conditions hold. The sale price of the leading chain is higher than that of the following chain at all levels. Therefore, since the supply chains follow the price Stackelberg game, all levels in the leading chain obtain lower profits than the corresponding levels in the following chain. Thus, there is the second-mover advantage.   The relations between price and profit in this case appear in Table 7 in Appendix 3.
ii) If 1 2   Theorem 5) When the leader has a larger market size, the following relations are true for the manufacturer, distributor, and retailer prices of the leading and following chains in the DD structure: 
Result 6)
For the leading and following chains in the DD structure with different market sizes, the following conditions hold.
-In a market where the leading chain has a smaller market size than the following chain, the leader obtains a lower profit than the follower. Obviously, market size has a significant impact on the profitability of the leading chain; this, in turn, decreases the profit of this chain with respect to the following chain. The supply chain has the second-mover advantage in this case.
-If the leading supply chain has a greater market size, the leader will not always receive greater profit than the follower despite its greater market size. In fact, in the DD structure, the supply chain has the first-mover advantage per .22 Con , while it has the second-mover advantage per   .22
c Con , and the follower therefore receives more profit than the leader.
-If the market size of the leader is smaller than those of the other supply chains, the leader's prices will be higher than those of the follower if the following conditions are true for  and  for the defined values in set X:
-If the follower has a smaller market size than the other supply chains, the profit of the leader will be higher than that of the follower when the following condition is met for  and  for the defined values in set X:
. This means that for 6 / 8   , the first-mover advantage is met, while for the other values of  , there is the second-mover advantage, and the leader obtains lower profit than the follower. Eric [33] , Dastidar [34] , and Qian [17] have mentioned that in the price Stackelberg game, the supply chain has the second-mover advantage (follower). It can be observed from Table 7 that this is not always the case. When the supply chains have the same market size, or the leader has a smaller market size than the follower, the supply chain has the second-mover advantage.
For a better understanding of the conditions assumed for the relations to be met, the total profits of the centralized and decentralized supply chains are shown in two separate charts for 12   , all the values of set Y, and 0.6   . According to Figure 1 , the leading chain obtains more profits than the following chain for all values of  in the centralized structure. However, the leader obtains lower profits than the follower for the values of  > 0.38 in the decentralized structure (Con.22).
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Result 7) Effect of presence of a leader in the market
According to the resultant price and profit relations for different scenarios of the market size, the effect of presence of a leader in the market in three cases 1 2   , 1 2   , and 12   is shown in Tables 9, 10, and 11, respectively (These tables appear in Appendix 3).
The price and profit relations and the necessary conditions are indicated in {.} in all the three tables.
The following points can be inferred from Tables 9, 10, and 11.
1-In the CC structure, a chain with a larger market size offers a higher price and gains a higher profit in both Nash and Stackelberg scenarios. However, a chain that sells its products at a higher price gains lower profits when 1 2   .
2-In the DD structure, the profits of the leading and following chains are regarded as the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the profits of decentralized chains in the Nash scenario where 3-In the DD structure, the leading chain never obtains higher profits than in the Nash scenario in different cases of market size, but the follower always obtains higher profit.
Result 8) Managerial insights
A general conclusion is drawn in terms of the best supply chain decisions under various conditions (Table 12 ). In other words, the best power structure in the market is selected for obtaining the greatest profit according to the parameters and structure of the supply chain. Therefore, the following table is used as a solution for managerial decisions under various conditions in a duopoly market with two competitive supply chains.
Please Insert Table 12 . About here -For different situations of the market size, the following conditions hold. For example, if the centralized chains function in the market power balance mode (as shown in Table 8 ), offering a new product in the market will cause both chains to benefit from the process. In such a market, both chains will benefit if either of them becomes a leader. In the DD structure, it is better for both chains to make simultaneous decisions.
-Finally, the last column shows which of the movers, first or second, can obtain a higher profit than its competitor in presence of a leader in the market.
6-Conclusion and future works
We investigated a competitive model between two supply chains with three echelons. Four scenarios were developed based on the power structures of the two chains in the market. For cases of a power balance mode between the two chains in the market, two scenarios were developed, which were dependent on the structures of the two chains (centralized or decentralized). The other two scenarios captured the market conditions with imbalanced power between the chains. In fact, the model attempted to analyze the impact of market power imbalance on the prices and profits of the supply chains under different conditions of market size for supply chains with the same structure. By investigating different scenarios (combination of the structures of the supply chains and the power structure between them), we achieved novel results, which had not been achieved in the previous research through investigation of only one of these at a time.
The significant, novel findings of the research appear in Tables 6, 8 , and 12. The results demonstrated that having a centralized structure is the only case in which presence of a leader is beneficial to both of the supply chains for different market size conditions. Besides, in the price Stackelberg game, the supply chain does not always have a second mover. Eventually, the following conditions hold regarding the effect of the relations between the market sizes of the supply chains on profit.
-If the chains are of the same size, or the chain with the smaller-sized market functions as the leader, the following chain will obtain maximal profit regardless of chain structure (compared with the leading chain and supply chains in the Nash scenario). The presence of the leader is beneficial to a centralized leading chain but not to a decentralized one.
-If a chain with a larger market size functions as a leader in the market power imbalance mode, presence of a leader will benefit the following chain with a smaller market size under any conditions regardless of chain structure, but maximal profit will not necessarily be obtained. The presence of the leader is beneficial to a centralized leader chain but not to a decentralized one.
-The presence of the leader will be beneficial to both chains if they are centralized, regardless of their market sizes. In the DD structure, however, the presence of the leader is favorable to the following chain and disadvantageous to the leading chain.
The conclusions were drawn based on the assumptions made for this competitive model. Therefore, the model can be developed by several methods. Firstly, price was taken into account as the competition parameter while other factors can be considered as well. Demand uncertainty is another aspect of the model. Secondly, we assumed in this paper that all chain members have symmetric information on demand, while in other models, asymmetric information can be developed for all members. Further studies are required to investigate different power structures in the supply chain. Also, more members can be considered at each level in future studies. Finally, we assumed that all members in both chains are risk-neutral. In future studies, riskaverse members can be considered.
Appendix 1. Proving the theorems
Proof of Theorem 1). The relations are proven according to Table 3 .
Relations 1 and 2: 
According to (*) and   , the above relation is always positive; therefore, 22 
Now, the sign of the expressions is specified. 3  2  2  1  2  2  1   2  3  2  2  2  3  2  2  1   2  2  2  3  2  3  2  3  2  2 4 (
For proving the above relations, (*) is used. The other expressions are negative because   . Therefore, 
Proof of Theorem 5). We have: 
Due to the similarity of the above relations, only the third relation is evaluated here.
Since   , the denominator is always positive. Therefore, we only need to evaluate the numerator.
Since   and 
The expression is always positive according to (*); therefore, the numerator is always positive. Therefore, 
 
Retail price
Con .14 Con
Profit of retailer, distributor and manufacturer 1 1 
 
Presence of a leader in the market: When there is a leader in the market, both chains gain greater profit than in the power balance mode in the market. The chain that functions as the follower gains higher profit than the leader.
Second mover 1 2 
 
The power imbalance mode of the market is beneficial to the chain with a smaller market size (the first chain) because it can obtain higher profits if it functions as a leader than when there is no leader in the market. Presence of a leader in the market is beneficial to the chain with a greater market size (the second chain) because it gains higher profit than in the Nash scenario.
Finally, presence of a leader in the market is beneficial to both chains.
 
The chain with a larger market size (the first chain) benefits from the power imbalance mode because the leadership leads to more profit than in the Nash mode. The chain with a smaller market size (the second chain) benefits from the power imbalance mode because it can obtain more profit in this market than in a market without a leader.
Finally, presence of a leader benefits both chains in the market.
First mover
Both decentralized 1 2 
 
Absence of a leader in the market. In a market with a leader, the following chain obtains greater profit than in the power balance mode, while the leading chain earns less profit. Presence of a leader in the market is in favor of the chain acting as the follower. Hence, it is not beneficial to either of the supply chains.
 
The first chain with a smaller market size, which functions as the leader, obtains lower profits than in the Nash scenario. Therefore, it is not beneficial to this chain to be a leader. However, it is beneficial to the second chain with a greater market size to be a follower and obtain more profits than in the Nash scenario. Therefore, presence of a leader is not advised in such conditions because it is beneficial only to the following chain. However, the first chain with a greater market size loses much in the market despite being a leader.
 
Supply chain with a larger market size. In different conditions and combinations of competitive parameters, it is not favorable for this chain to act as a leader. This chain obtains more profits in a market without a leader. Supply chain with a smaller market size. In different combinations of competitive parameters, it can be stated that presence of a leader is beneficial to this chain. Unlike the former chain, this one can obtain more profits than in the Nash scenario if it functions as the following chain with a smaller size. Therefore, the power imbalance mode is beneficial only to the chain with a smaller market size, which acts as the follower.
Second mover or first mover
